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RUSKOLA – GUIDE TO LEGAL ORIENTALISM

In 2016, Teemu Ruskola's book Legal Orientalism:
China, the United States, and Modern Law was published in translation in China. This essay analyzes
the Chinese reception of this book. Originally
addressed to a North Atlantic readership, Legal Orientalism examines critically the asymmetric relationship in which Euro-American law and Chinese
law stand to one another, the former regarding itself
as an embodiment of universal values while viewing
the latter's as culturally particular ones. The essay
explores what happens when a “Western” work of
self-criticism is transmitted to an “Eastern” audience. In this context, it analyzes the politics of selfOrientalism, Oriental legalism, and the comparative
method.

its nominal independence, despite its having been
subjected to numerous forms of legal, economic,
and political intervention after the end of the First
Opium War in 1842.
With China’s economic and political rise in the
twenty-first century, it is increasingly important
for us to consider Chinese law in an expressly comparative postcolonial frame. I wrote a monograph
entitled Legal Orientalism: China, the United
States, and Modern Law (Harvard University Press,
2013) in order to understand the role China has
played in Western legal and political thinking and
the effect these discourses have in turn had on both
Chinese and Western law. The book was addressed
to a specifically Euro-American academic audience. I am heartened that it continues to generate
debate among that readership, as evidenced by two
articles tackling my analysis in back-to-back issues
of the American Journal of Comparative Law just
last year.1 However, I will not elaborate here on my
views on these recent articles. Rather, I will examine at some length responses to the book’s Chinese
translation by Professor Wei Leijie, published in
2016 by the China University of Political Science
and Law Press. While many readers in China took
note of the original English version of Legal Orientalism, the Chinese translation has – understandably – received much greater attention, with
Thomas Coendet characterizing the notice it has
attracted as “a second wave” of the book’s reception
in the PRC.2

I.
LAW, THE POSTCOLONIAL, AND CHINA
It is one of the key tenets of postcolonial theory that
modernity is built on a paradox. On the one hand, it
is premised a claim to universality. With modernity,
humans broke free from the shackles of medieval
superstition. In the place of a blind obeisance to
authority and tradition, we have come to believe
that every person and every political community
has the right to be in charge of their own destiny
(which in turn gives rise to a contradiction between
individual and collective rights). While these rights
are indeed viewed as universal – epitomized today
by the discourse of human rights – it is also the case
that their historical origins are highly particular,
emerging from a specifically European, or North
Atlantic, tradition. They have become globalized,
largely through processes of European colonialism.
It is because of this imperial history that modern
institutions are both particular and universal. That
is also why they put the so-called non-Western
world (for lack of a better word) in an impossible
bind: either they can choose to adopt North Atlantic
institutions, or else they will be left be outside of
modernity – and indeed history itself, in the most
extreme Hegelian narrative.

Before turning to Legal Orientalism’s reception in
China, I preface my analysis with the poststructuralist axiom that the author, like God, is dead and
that once a piece of writing enters the world it takes
on a life of its own and readers are free to interpret it
as they wish. Hence, my focus below isn’t so much
whether any particular Chinese reviewer has gotten my argument “right” or “wrong” (although I
have some concerns about that too). Instead, I am
more interested in considering how the reception of
Legal Orientalism in China illuminates, or challenges, the very claims I make in the book. Originally directed to a North Atlantic readership, Legal
Orientalism examines critically the asymmetric
relationship in which American law and Chinese
law stand to one another, the former regarding itself
as an embodiment of universal values while viewing
the latter as an expression of culturally particular
ones. What happens, then, when a “Western” work
of self-critique such as mine is transmitted to an
“Eastern” audience?

Law is evidently one of the most central institutions
of the modern world. To be modern is to be born to
be free and equal – American revolutionaries
thought these notions “self-evident” – and for moderns, both freedom and equality are essentially legal
attributes to be guaranteed by the state. Law is thus
an exceptionally fruitful field for analyzing the
postcolonial condition. Until recently, however,
postcolonial analyses of non-Western law tended
focus on legal systems that had been colonized outright by Western imperial powers. This focus left
Chinese law, perhaps most notably, outside the field
of postcolonial theory. Historically, China retained
ANCILLA IURIS 2021, 146
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II.
READING LEGAL ORIENTALISM
IN CHINA

one thing, I should acknowledge that many Chinese
readers themselves are highly sensitive to the fact
that the arguments of Legal Orientalism take on different valences in different geopolitical settings.
Both Ma Jianyin and Lu Nan, for example, applaud
the book’s critique of Orientalism as a welcome
intervention for a Euro-American audience, but
they find its critiques misplaced in China.3 Indeed,
Ma is concerned about how they might be abused
politically in the name of nationalism, while Lu
worries about the dangers of criticizing rights discourse at this stage in China’s “legal construction.”
In Lu’s view, for a Westerner enjoying the protection of rights to caution Chinese citizens about their
limits is like “an overweight person asking a thin
person to lose weight.”4 I am not unsympathetic to
Lu’s observation – I state in the book myself that
without any doubt “there is much more political
mileage left in [rights discourse] in contemporary
China than in the United States”5 – yet I believe the
benefits as well as costs of rights must be assessed
together.

In order to appreciate how Legal Orientalism has
been read in China, in this essay I seek to treat the
book as an ethnographic object, as it were – not as a
creation of mine but as a thing to be observed in a
new environment, with a focus on Chinese reviewers’ and scholars’ reactions to it. My hope is that
observing the book’s reception in a “foreign” setting
may help illuminate further the ways in which East
and West are as much cultural as geographic coordinates – even as those coordinates have shifted
even since the book was first published, let alone
since I first began thinking about the concept of
legal Orientalism at the dawn of the millennium.
The book opens by asking why it is that, after the fall
of the Soviet Union, China has to come to be seen as
the world’s leading human rights violator with the
United States occupying the position of the world’s
chief law-enforcer. There is no question that
China’s human rights record continues to blight its
global reputation – and seems to be getting only
worse by the day – yet there is also no question that
today China is defined at least as much by its enormous economic clout as by its political shortcomings. Investigating Legal Orientalism’s reception in
China at this specific conjuncture may help illuminate changes in the continually evolving East-West
relationship.

Below, I will focus on a few aspects of Legal Orientalism that have garnered the most attention in
China. Overall, reactions have been quite polarized,
with readers agreeing or disagreeing strongly with
several aspects of the book. While I did not necessarily foresee such a divergence of responses, I am
certainly not unhappy about it, as that is precisely
why the book has occasioned more academic and
popular debate than I would have expected. Some of
the most debated issues involve (1) the intertwined
questions of “legal Orientalism”/“self-Orientalism,” (2) the possibility of an “Oriental legalism,”
and (3) the nature of comparison and comparative
method more generally. I will consider each below.

When Professor Wei asked for permission to translate Legal Orientalism – and I would be remiss not
to note here that the quality of the translation he
produced has garnered much praise – I was of
course pleased at the prospect of a wider Chinese
readership. At the same time, I was apprehensive
about how my argument would translate, politically, into the context of a “rising China.” My chief
concern was that my critique of Euro-American
legal and judicial adventures in China would be
transformed into an alibi for an increasingly muscular Chinese nationalism. At the same time, I
hoped that my critique of legal Orientalism might
contribute to the re-evaluation of the Chinese legal
tradition, given that the official socialist position
has regarded it historically as a feudal relic. Finally,
I also hoped to contribute to a greater understanding of the limits of rights discourse in China’s development, especially the ways in which the elaboration of rights can serve to depoliticize significant,
even revolutionary reforms, including the redistribution of massive social and economic resources.

First, though, let me note one issue that has not
aroused much controversy. It is a core thesis of the
book that over the course of the nineteenth century
what had been a largely historical and theoretical
discourse of Oriental despotism began to take on
increasingly material forms. A diffuse set of prejudices about Chinese law was translated into international legal institutions, exemplified perhaps
most notably by the practice of extraterritoriality in
3

To some extent, my fears and hopes were not
unfounded, but ultimately Legal Orientalism’s life
in China has been far richer than I anticipated. For
ANCILLA IURIS 2021, 146
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who deny its existence9 to those who believe its
existence is limited (whether historically, consigned to an earlier period,10 or professionally,
afflicting legal scholars rather than legislators11),
and those who believe it is an important feature of
Chinese legal modernity.12 As one might expect,
readers who are committed to the values of EuroAmerican rule-of-law are the most skeptical of the
notion of self-Orientalism, as it puts in question the
ostensibly universal and self-evident nature of
rights. Correspondingly, the notion is highly attractive to those on the Chinese left who believe that a
liberal rights discourse threatens the socialist legacy of the PRC and provides an ideological justification for transforming it into an increasingly capitalist society. Similarly, a critique of legal reformers as
self-Orientalists appeals to readers who might be
called cultural conservatives or nativists, wishing
to preserve China’s indigenous values and traditions or to construct an alternative Chinese legal
modernity.

“Oriental” states. In general, Chinese readers find
this the least problematic part of the book. For one
thing, the basic contours of this history are familiar
to the Chinese audience, even though many EuroAmerican audiences remain ignorant of it. To be
sure, this history also holds potentially great appeal
to Chinese nationalism, which is controversial.
This appeal is perhaps especially evident in the field
of international law, and international law scholar
Cai Congyan has indeed linked the critique of legal
Orientalism to a robust “Chinese exceptionalism.”6
At the same time, scholars such as Cheng Jinhua
have expressly cautioned against leaping from a critique of American legal Orientalism to a Sinocentric legal nationalism.7 Nonetheless most reviewers
find the book’s analysis of extraterritoriality valuable simply from a historical perspective.8
III.
THE POLITICS OF SELF-ORIENTALISM

To be sure, some readers who find self-Orientalism
to be of limited applicability are simply not using it
in the sense in which I define it. Jiang Haisong, for
example, insists that China’s joining the WTO and
the global free trade regime isn’t an instance of selfOrientalism because doing so has in fact benefitted
China economically.13 However, insofar as selfOrientalism is an epistemological condition –
adopting the values of an Other – it is not defined by
its material effects. In fact, self-Orientalism may
well be the most materially rewarding choice available, yet not any less of an Orientalism because of
that. Even if one were to insist on approaching the
issue through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis,
presumably one would have to weigh material gains
against cultural costs, for example. The economic,
the political, and the social cannot be separated
neatly.

As the title suggests, the main focus of Legal Orientalism is legal Orientalism, or Western discourses
of Chinese law, broadly defined. Yet what has
resulted in the liveliest debate among Chinese readers is not my analysis of legal Orientalism as such
but what I characterize in the book as “self-Orientalism” – viz., Chinese discourses that accept
(Western) legal institutions as self-evidently superior to their indigenous counterparts. Although I
discuss this phenomenon only briefly in the final
chapter of the book, in retrospect it is not surprising
that it should be of particular interest to Chinese
legal scholars, raising the question not only how
Western observers view Chinese law but also the
more immediate one of how Chinese legal scholars
themselves regard the object of their study.
Even as I was writing the book, I was concerned that
at least some readers would dismiss my observations about self-Orientalism as pejorative and condescending. In fact, the reactions to my analysis of
Chinese self-Orientalism run the gamut from those
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See e.g. Congyan Cai, The Rise of China and International Law: Taking
Chinese Exceptionalism Seriously (2019), 59–61.
Cheng Jinhua (程金华), Lixing Duidai Zhongguo De Wufa Youfa Fanfa
Yu Chao Fa Falü Dongfang Zhuyi De Qishi (理性对待中国的无法、有
法、反法与超法 –“法律东方主义”的启示) [Rational Approaches to
Discourses on Chinese Lawlessness, Lawfulness, Anti-legality, and
Extra-legality: Inspirations from Legal Orientalism], Jiaoda Faxue (交大
法学) [Shanghai Jiao Tong University Law Review] no.3 (2017), 7–11, 10.
See e.g. Xie Jing (谢晶), Hexu Qianbi Shenhong Se You Falü Dongfang
Zhuyi Zhan Kai (何须浅碧深红色? – 由《法律东方主义》展开) [No
Need for Light Green or Crimson? Starting from Legal Orientalism],
Xiamen Daxue Falü Pinglun (厦门大学法律评论) [Xiamen University
Law Review] no.29 (2017), 86–100.
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IV.
THE POLITICS OF ORIENTAL LEGALISM

not as an Eastern universalism with a potential to
replace legal Orientalism as a global hegemonic discourse, but as an authentically Chinese legal subjectivity that would enjoy a position of equality with
its Western counterpart, overcoming the built-in
asymmetry that haunts any dialogue conducted
under the conditions of legal Orientalism.17 Rather
than pure nativism, Wei’s Oriental legalism is one
that would continue to seek to learn from others,
although not only from Europe or the United States
but also from China’s neighbors – and rather than
focusing on Western theories of law, it would seek
to understand how Western legal institutions actually function. Tian Feilong’s version of Oriental
legalism has potentially more imperial implications
for the future of China, invoking an ancient dynastic vision of All-Under-Heaven (天下) as a conceptual umbrella of China’s controversial One Belt One
Road initiative.18 To be sure, Tian too insists that
the goal should be only to reach a position of equality with the West, but one worries that this might
still translate to a bipolar world rather than a genuinely plural one – a world made up of Euro-American and Sinocentric supremacies, in a twenty-first
century update of the global divisions of the Cold
War.

Oriental legalism is another concept that has garnered a lion’s share of the attention paid to Legal
Orientalism in China. Again, this is rather paradoxical, given that the book is, emphatically, about legal
Orientalism. This focus has built-in limitations that
I fully acknowledge in my analysis: rather than an
ethnographic account of the East, legal Orientalism
is a theory about the West’s ideas about the East,
and more fundamentally about how the East-West
binary is built into the very foundation of modernity
and its institutions. Oriental legalism, in contrast, is
a term that occurs only once in the body of Legal
Orientalism, and even then only on the antepenultimate page of the last chapter.14 There, I specifically
decline to speculate about the future of Chinese law,
noting merely, “Perhaps China will in fact one day
submit to rule-of-law in its modern Euro-American
form, thereby confirming its universality. Or maybe
it will recast law’s rule in the form of an evolving
Chinese universalism – an Oriental legalism, as it
were.”15
That is all: I do not offer a theory of Oriental legalism, nor do I predict when or whether such a thing
will ever materialize. It is only a suggestion, a gesture – an invitation for readers in China to take up
the question of law’s future at the eastern end of the
Eurasian landmass in the beginning of the third
millennium of the Common Era. And many readers
of Legal Orientalism have evidently taken up this
invitation, even as others find it premature, ill-considered, and/or dangerous. This is how it should be.
Not that people in the West should not concern
themselves with what is happening in China today
as well as in the future – with local and global implications for humans as well as flora and non-human
fauna – yet the primary political responsibility for
the region evidently belongs to those who live there.

At the skeptical end of the spectrum, Sun Guodong
worries that the rise of Oriental legalism would
thwart China’s modernization, by promoting a
sense of cultural self-satisfaction and a rejection of
Western legal values.19 If China is free to define rule
of law for its own purposes, he suggests, then “no
further action is needed for China to realize the rule
of law – it has already achieved it in the Chinese
way.”20 Sun’s concerns about ethnocentric arrogance aren’t unjustified, but his conclusion seems
too hasty. Whether China has already realized the
ideals of Oriental legalism depends entirely on what
those ideals are. What those ideals are can hardly be
inferred from the existing institutions in their current form. On the contrary, they may best be found
in Chinese citizens’ critiques of their legal system.
However one defines rule of law – unquestionably,
there are numerous ways to do so – it is always an
ideal and unlikely to be fully realized in any set of
institutions anywhere, East or West.

Given my purposely open-ended and undefined
usage of the term, what readers have made of Oriental legalism varies considerably. Some reviewers
have highly specific notions of what Oriental legalism needs to accomplish – for example, calling for
an explicit theorization of the role of the Party in the
Chinese legal system or of China’s pluralist legalist
heritage.16 Wei Leijie envisions Oriental legalism,
14
15
16

Wei Leijie (魏磊杰), Tuoshi Lijie Falü Dongfang Zhuyi He Yi Keneng (妥
适理解法律东方主义何以可能) [Understanding Legal Orientalism’s
Emergence], Jiaoda Faxue (交大法学) [Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Law Review] no.3 (2017), 89–94, 92.
18 Tian (fn. 11), 23.
19 Sun Guodong (孙国东), Xiyang Jing Yu Fazhi De Zhongguo Jie Ping Luo
Demu Falü Dongfang Zhuyi (“西洋镜”与法治的“中国结” – 评络德
睦《法律东方主义》) [“The Western Mirror” and “the Chinese Complex”
on Rule of Law: On Teemu Ruskola’s Legal Orientalism], Shida Faxue (师
大法学) [East China Normal University Law Review] no.1 (2017), 292–
307, 307.
20 Ibid., 306.
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To be sure, the term occurs also on page 232, not in the text itself but in
the final subheading of the chapter, “Legal Orientalism or Oriental Legalism.”
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Ma Yongping (马永平), Jiekai Xifang Fazhi Huayu Tixi De Ling Yiceng
Miansha Ping Wei Leijie Yi Falü Dongfang Zhuyi (揭开西方法治话语体
系的另一层面纱-评魏磊杰译《法律东方主义》) [Unpacking the Western Discourse of Rule of Law: A Review of Legal Orientalism Translated
by Wei Leijie], Renmin Fayuan Bao (人民法院报) [People’s Court
Newspaper] (21 October 2016), 6.
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V.
THE POLITICS OF COMPARISON

delineated clearly from those in the market, and it
may be this exceptionalist perspective that animates at least some of the discomfort with this comparison.23

Beyond its substantive focus on law, Legal Orientalism is also concerned with the possibility of comparison across cultures in a world that is indeed
structured and understood in terms of an EastWest binary. I offer a critique of functionalism, recognizing it as one way of overcoming that binary –
albeit often at the cost universalizing Western categories and by flattening differences that do matter.
However, I also provide a case study utilizing what I
characterize as a kind of “perverse” functionalism,
looking for analogies between two disparate, even
oppositional objects: Euro-American corporation
law and Confucian family law. The hypothesis that
contemporary Euro-American corporate law and
imperial Chinese family law could be functionally
equivalent will surely raise the (comparative) lawyer’s eye-brows in either tradition. Yet the point of
such comparison is precisely to understand how
these objects come to be constituted as oppositional
in the first place. As an antifoundationalist
approach, it takes neither the family nor the corporation as a given but examines how each becomes
naturalized in relation to the other. How and why is
the economic sphere of the market opposed to the
intimate sphere of the family, and what is at stake
on maintaining this opposition?

Yet the reactions to the corporations-and-kinship
comparison have been as divergent as the reactions
to the notion of self-Orientalism. Zheng Ge finds
the comparison particularly compelling, observing
the continuing importance of families and households as economic subjects in China today.24 Other
enthusiasts of the analogy cite its reversibility.
Rather than taking either object of the comparison
as a pre-existing standard against which to judge
the other, it allows us to consider how the two
objects are defined in relation to one another, without according analytic priority to either: just as we
can describe China’s institutions in the EuroAmerican language of law, we can also describe U.S.
legal institutions in terms of Chinese ones. Du Jin
draws attention to this reversibility expressly, and
so does Zheng, characterizing it as a method that
can lead to a “fusion of horizons” in the Gadamerian
sense.25
VI.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by returning to the point with
which I opened this survey of Chinese reviews of
my book: it is futile for any author to insist on the
“correct” interpretation of his or her views. At the
end of the day, the main concern of my book is to
understand how legal discourses characterize certain legal subjects and institutions as more or less
universal and more or less particular, and what
social, political, and materials effects these classifications have. The varied, even polarized, responses
to Legal Orientalism among Chinese readers provides robust evidence that where Chinese law fits
on the spectrum of universality versus particularity
remains an open and contested question. Many of
the reviewers of the book do not hesitate to take
sides in the East-West dialectic. Such responses
can be viewed as instances of legal Orientalism in
action – the ceaseless elaboration and contestation
of who and what is universal or particular.

Several observers have criticized my use of the family law/corporation law analogy. Lu Nan objects to
the comparison perhaps most strongly, arguing that
it ignores the very different values that inform corporations and kinship structures.21 Jiang Haisong
similarly claims that the comparison “exaggerates”
any similarities they may have.22 I do of course take
note of the distinct ideologies that justify modern
corporations and Confucian clan organizations – it
would be impossible to miss their differences – but
that is precisely the point of this intentionally perverse comparison: vastly different value systems
can produce and justify similar material hierarchies. I also take it as a given that no analogy is perfect. By definition, an analogy implies the presence
of both similarities and differences, or else the relationship at stake is not one of analogy but identity,
rendering comparison redundant. I suspect one
reason for the vehemence of objections to this particular comparison lies in its subject matter,
namely, linking the world of intimate relations with
the economic relations of the marketplace. In her
analysis of comparative family law – including but
not limited to the Chinese context – Janet Halley
has coined the term “family law exceptionalism” to
express the idea that kinship relations must be

23 Janet Halley/Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family
Law: A Report from the Up Against Family Law Exceptionalism Conference, American Journal of Comparative Law 58 (2010), 753–776.
24 Zheng (fn. 12), 41.
25 Du Jin (杜金), Feiyue Miwu Dongfang Zhuyi Falü Huayu De Fansi Luo
Demu Falü Dongfang Zhuyi Duhougan (飞越迷雾：东方主义法律话语的
反思–络德睦《法律东方主义：中国、美国与现代法》读后感)[Cutting
Through the Maze: Reflections on Discourses of Legal Orientalism:
Thoughts After Reading Legal Orientalism], Renda Falü Pinglun (人大
法律评论) [Renmin University Law Review] no.1 (2017), 64–84, 73–74;
Zheng (fn. 12), 40.

21 Lu (fn. 3), 190–191.
22 Jiang (fn. 13), 107.
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Notably, though, a number of readers balk at choosing sides. Cheng Jinhua, for one, cautions against
leaning toward either Oriental legalism or legal Orientalism.26 Liang Zhiping insists on the plurality of
the Chinese legal universe itself, noting that “selfOrientalists” come in many varieties and exercise
power in complicated ways that cannot be ultimately understood within an East-West framework.27 Zheng Ge objects perhaps most strongly to
the universal-particular dichotomy itself, calling
for law-reformers not to be distracted by legal ideologies but to be “open-minded” and “pragmatic”
instead.28 More generally, he instructs Chinese
readers not to leverage American self-criticisms
against the United States – satisfying as that might
be – but urges them instead to approach comparative law as an avenue for self-reflection.29 To be
sure, transcending East-West dichotomies is easier
said than done. I offer an “ethic of Orientalism” as
one solution, while fully recognizing that there is no
single, adequate response to legal Orientalism. Xie
Jing indeed finds my offering inadequate, turning
to Heidegger for further theoretical tools – a proposal I welcome warmly.30 I even agree with the
reviewer who observes that my analysis does not
offer a “cure” for self-Orientalism, or instruct the
reader how to “prevent” it in the first place.31 In my
view, though, that is asking for too much. Ultimately
legal Orientalism is built into the epistemological
foundations of modernity. We need to manage it,
but we cannot simply delete it from historical memory. To quote Dipesh Chakrabarty, European legal
categories are “both indispensable and inadequate.”32 We have no choice but to continue living
with them, at least for now, but we must live with
them as consciously and wisely as we can.

26 Cheng, Rational, 10–11.
27 Liang Zhiping (梁治平), You Fa Yu Wu Fa (有法与无法) [Law and Lawlessness], Dongfang Zao Bao Shanghai Shuping (东方早报 上海书评)
[Dongfang Daily-Shanghai Book Review], 2016 Oct. 9.
28 Zheng Ge (郑戈), Cong Zhongguo Fazhihua Dao FaZhi Zhongguohua
Falü Dongfang Zhuyi Gei Women De Qi Shi (从中国法治化到法治中国
化 – 《法律东方主义》给我们的启示) [From Bringing Rule of Law to
China to Sinifying Rule of Law: Inspirations from Legal Orientalism],
Shanghai Zhengfa Xueyuan Xuebao (上海政法学院学报) [Journal of
Shanghai University of Political Science and Law] no.2 (2018), 17–19, 19.
29 Zheng (fn. 12), 41.
30 Jin Zining (金自宁), Dongxifang Xiangyu Zhi Huayu Yu Xianshi: Falü
Dongfang Zhuyi Zhaji (东西方相遇之话语与现实：《法律东方主义：中
国、美国与现代法》札记) [Discourse and Reality of the East-West
Encounter: A Comment on Legal Orientalism], Renda Falü Pinglun (人
大法律评论) [Renmin University Law Review] no.1 (2017), 35–44, 40.
31 Ma Yongping (fn. 16), 6.
32 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and
Historical Difference (2000), 6.
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